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1. Introduction
Real estate bubbles have occurred in many countries over the last few years. 
Therefore it is still a very popular and widely explained topic. A lot of authors 
in their researche try to implement the way of explanation based on the wide 
range of outlooks often beyond the economy, linking different sciences such as 
a law, a psychology or biology. Multiplicity of perspectives during the explana-
tion process is the best evidence of complexity of the real estate bubble. The 
purpose of the article is the explanation of the real estate bubbles which were 
observed in the United States, Spain and Poland and were disastrous for their 
economies. The cognitive clarification of such complex process was done on the 
ground of new institutional economy. This article explains the factors which cre-
ate the increase beyond the fundamentals using Novosibirsk School of Economic 
Sociology and Svietlana Kirdina’s institutional matrices theory. The research has 
been performed on the set of institutions conductive to the formation of bubbles. 
The combination of dominant and complementary institutional matrix crucial for 
the creation of enormous price growth has been identified and described. The 
following hypothesis has been formulated: the creation of a real estate bubble is 
the effect of lack of optimal combination of the dominant and complementary 
matrices institutions. In the research part of the article there were presented the 
institutions which influence the balanced structure and create the conditions 
for the blow of the bubble. Two main areas were examined. First, unintended 
effects of intervention in the market economy mechanism in the form of estab-
lishment of housing finance organizations, social housing policy, and tax and 
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subsidies systems. Second, wrongly understood full “liberalization” of market 
and deregulation of all market processes was examined from the perspective of 
the creation of debt for the customers and financing banks themselves. Therefore 
the research was performed on the securitization process, capital requirements 
for banks, in the area of lending standards and new banking products.
2. Literature review
2.1. Definitions
At the beginning it is worth to define the institution. To find the appropriate 
definition and elements of institution it is important to underline several signifi-
cant elements of institutions indicated by authors of the old and new institutional 
economics. 
Thorstein Veblen one of the “founding fathers” of institutionalism formulates 
the following definition: social institutions are in essence the dominant ways of 
thinking, taking into account the different social conditions and certain functions 
of the individual and the society. […] Each community can be seen as economic 
mechanism consisting of what we call economic institutions. These institutions 
are usual ways of life processes’ regulation in the society with regard to the ma-
terial environment in which it exists [38]. In this definition author divided insti-
tutions into two types: social and economic. The first are the ways of thinking, 
attitudes or method of recognition of social phenomenon. The second group cre-
ates economic mechanism and is the basis for the action of people in the material 
environment. For better understanding of economic and social order it is crucial 
to refer to the historically shaped institutional framework forming the specific 
context of human activity [5]. 
The second of the “founding fathers” John Rogers Commons introduced, in 
the place of the impersonal market exchange, characteristic for the orthodox eco-
nomics, the concept of a transaction. It led to the creation of the conception which 
allows understanding the activities of individuals, their economic and social life 
with the accompanying problems. Transactions are the meeting places of econom-
ics, physics, psychology, ethics, jurisprudence and politics. They are the two or 
more wills giving, taking, persuading, coercing, defrauding, commanding, obey-
ing, competing, governing, in the word of scarcity, mechanism of rules of conduct 
[5]. J. R. Commons stressed the importance of the regulations, state legislation and 
well-developed process of constituting the law. He underlined the fact that good 
legislation creates appropriate incentives for individuals or groups of individuals to 
act wisely and worthy. The law however, limits activities that are harmful [7]. 
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In the new institutional economics the work of Ronald Harry Coase Noble 
Prize winner in 1991 should be described as the background and milestone in 
the direction of the transaction costs economics. R.H. Coase observation of the 
market shows that the transactions are not made in emptiness, but within the 
institutions that organized the market [6]. His approach to institutions is very 
broad starting from patterns of human behaviour and on the formal regulations 
at the various levels of social life ending. Rational individuals achieving their aims 
act always in the institutional environment. They need to take it into account, 
and even in their way of achieve goals they could try to change the rules for their 
benefit and also break them. This fact is the evidence that the famous institution-
al balance of the market structure could not guarantee perfect competition [5].
For Oliver Williamson institutions are primarily the principles and rules gov-
erning transactions which relate to the conception of the “contracting human” 
characterized by limited rationality and opportunism behaviour [31]. Douglass 
North proposed the definition of institutions as rules of the game or more for-
mally human made constraints that shape human interaction and cooperation. As 
a result, build the structure of incentives in the area of exchange between people, 
whether political, social or economic. Institutional changes shape the way of soci-
ety evolution and are therefore the key in understanding of historical changes [34]. 
Marshall Hodgson offered conception of institutions as a system of established and 
widely recognized rules in society that shape social interactions. Language, money, 
law, system of weights and measures, rules of behaviour at the table, companies 
and other organizations are within the scope of the definition of institution [17].
The presented overview of the definition does not cover probably all of the 
approaches to the institution. The multiplicity of definition attempts made by the 
wide range of authors shows the difficulty in finding single universal definition 
corresponding to the representatives of both the old and the new institutional-
ism. For the purpose of this paper presented set of definitions should be suffi-
cient, as it highlights the main elements of the institutions that will be used in the 
further analysis of real estate bubble. These elements are the rules of the game 
in the real estate market. The first group of rules is connected with the interven-
tion in the market economy through the establishment of housing finance orga-
nization and tax relief and subsidies for real estate purchases. The second one 
wrongly understood “liberalization” consists of rules at both levels: the creation 
of debt for the customers, but also at the stage of financing banks themselves. 
“Liberalization” means transferring risks through securitization process, lower 
capital requirements, lowering lending standards of banks such as loan-to-value 
ratio, long maturity period, or lack of verification of clients.
Similarly to institution also economic bubbles are not formally defined in the 
economics with a single universal definition which could help to identify them. 
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It is mainly due to the fact that this process is very complex and occurring over 
several hundreds of years. Multiplicity of markets, geographic spread and variety 
of items influenced by bubble makes this area still poorly understood. For the 
purpose of this article some repetitive and generally accepted definitions and 
characteristics of economic bubble are discussed.
The definition of bubble most often used in economic researches is: part of 
asset price movement that could not be explained on the basis of fundamentals. 
Fundamentals are a group of variables which determine asset prices. In the situ-
ation of a specific model of asset price determination, if there are serious prob-
lems with forecasting asset prices there could be a symptom of a bubble [14]. 
Whenever perceived or psychological value of assets exceeds its real eco-
nomic value the bubble exists. Economic value could be defined as value based 
on rational economic parameters, such as growth of population, growing com-
pany earnings, increased personal income, or some other fundamental economic 
factors directly linked with the asset’s rise in value. Alternatively, if the asset is 
sold for a lot more than its economic value, and the price increases for two or 
more times by growing psychological or perceived value then it is a bubble. [40]
In the above definition the great importance of value was stressed. Value is the 
concept from the area of metaphysics on the ground of neoclassical economics. In 
mainstream of the institutional economics, value is determined institutionally and 
culturally. Therefore, certain behaviours and choices are fixed in the institutions 
and culture. Despite they do not make the value they give it or receive it [37]. 
The last element which will be used in explanation of real estate bubble is 
the idea of soft budget constraint. It was introduced by Janos Kornai in his book 
Economics of Shortage [28] and in his expository paper [29] briefing the theory 
of chronic shortage in socialist economies. The term “budget constraint” was tak-
en from the theory of the household. The statement that the decision-maker has 
a budget constraint is equivalent to the Say’s principle. The budget constraint is 
not technical relation nor book-keeping identity, but postulate of a rational plan-
ning. Two important things must be emphasized. First, the budget constraint is 
connected with a behavioural characteristic of the decision-maker. It is used dur-
ing the decision about covering expenses from the income generated from vari-
ous sources. As a result, the decision-maker adjusts his expenses to his financial 
resources. Second, the budget constraint is a constraint on ex ante variables and 
firstly on demand. It is determined by expectation concerning future financial 
position when the actual spending will occur [30]. 
The budget constraint is “softened” when the severe relationship between ex-
penditure and earnings is relaxed, as excess expenditures over earnings will be 
covered by some other organization, usually by the State. An additional factor of 
‘softening” is that the decision-maker expects such external financial support with 
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high likelihood and this likelihood is firmly built into his behaviour. J. Kornai pre-
sented for socialist firms different ways and means of softening the budget con-
straint. There were divided into four groups: soft subsidies granted by national 
or local governments, soft taxation, soft credit and soft administrative prices [30]. 
Subsidy granted by the governments (national or local) is soft if it is nego-
tiable, subject to lobbing or bargaining. The subsidy is adjusted to cost overruns 
(past, present or future). The attribute soft in the taxation does not refer to the rate 
of taxation. Taxation system can be hard even with the low tax rate, if rules in the 
system are uniform, fixed for the long period and the payment of tax is enforced 
rigorously. In the system of soft taxation tax rates are not uniform, but almost tailor-
made according to the financial situation of different sectors or regions or forms of 
ownership. Soft credit is also not connected with the level of interest rate. Credit 
system can be hard event in the situation of low interest rates, when the fulfilment 
of credit contracts is severely enforced. In opposition the soft credit system means 
tolerance of unreliable debt service, postponement and rescheduling of credit pay-
ments. Soft administrative prices could be applied in the situation, when the price 
is not set by a free contract between seller and buyer, but by some bureaucratic 
organization. The administrative price is hard if, once set, it restricts expenditure 
and does not automatically adjust to cost rises [30]. 
2.2. The institutional matrices theory
On the ground of the system paradigm which deals not just with the indi-
vidual details of economy but with the system as a whole has been developed by 
Svietlana Kirdina the institutional matrices theory. Institutional matrices theory 
follows traditional Russian economic way of thinking and stands apart from west-
ern theories [24]. The most significant reason of a new theoretical framework 
construction was driven by the insufficiency of actual structures for understand-
ing and predicting social processes [25]. 
Theory of institutional matrices is founded on two key postulates playing the 
role of axioms. The first is a vision of society as an integral, indivisible object. The 
economic process should not be clarified only on the basis of data which char-
acterize economy in its substantive meaning. Economic processes explanation 
requires also reference to political (organizational) and value (motivational) as-
pects. The second theory postulate is assumption about basic institutions. Basic 
institutions are described by as historically stationary, very deeply rooted, and 
perennially reconstructed social forms. They were called as historical invariants 
allowing the society to survive and advance during historical evolution without 
losing its self-sufficiency and integrity. Basic institutions are independent of con-
crete social actors’ desire and will. The basic institutions category (distinct from 
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a broader category of “institution”) abstracts from social relations only histori-
cally stationary and internally unchangeable. Their function is regulation of social 
subsystems and the maintenance integrity of societies of different types [24].

 
 
Politics Ideology 
 
 
Economics 
Figure 1. The main projections of the society
Source: [23]
On the basis of stated assumptions the model of human society as a social 
system structured along three axes: economy, politics and ideology could be now 
elaborated on (see Figure 1). These three spheres are strongly interrelated mor-
phologically as sides, parts or elements of an indivisible whole [23]. The system 
approach to society makes it possible to identify economy, politics and ideology 
as the subsystems [24]. 
The economic sphere of society relates to the receipt of resources used for 
the reproduction of social entities. The political sphere is connected with interre-
lations for regular and organized civil and public society actions which purpose is 
to achieve defined local, regional or national aims. Finally, the ideological sphere 
is connected with the interrelations embodying significant cultural and social 
ideas and values of a nation of people [22].
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Figure 2. Institutional X- and Y-matrix
Source: [23]
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The corresponding set of basic institutions regulates each of described 
spheres. Empirical studies and historical observation as well as mathematical 
modelling and a wide philosophical approach constitute a ground for the follow-
ing hypothesis: two specific interdependent types of institutional matrices exist 
around the world. They are called X- and Y-matrix and are presented in Figure 2 
with their unique identities of each one in relation to the other. The matrices are 
different in function of the set of basing institutions creating them [23].
The X-matrix can be described by the following set of basic institutions. In the 
economic sphere institutions of the redistributive economy which is characterized 
by the existence of centre (on the top). The centre controls the movement of goods 
and services and also regulates the rights for their production and use. The politi-
cal sphere consists of institutions of a unitary (unitary-centralized) political order). 
The ideology projection is created by the institutions of communitarian ideology, 
whose essence is described by the idea of domination of collective, shared, public 
values over individual, sovereign, private ones. The priority of “We” over “I”. [9]
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Figure 3. Combination of dominant and complementary institutional matrices
Source: [23]
In the Y-matrix the basic institutions in the economic sphere are the institu-
tions of a market economy. Political institutions are connected with the federative 
(federative-subsidiary) political order. Finally, the ideological institutions consist 
of an individualistic (or subsidiary) ideology, proclaiming the supremacy of indi-
vidual values over the values of larger communities, bearing a subordinate char-
acter to groups and the personality. The priority of “I” over “We”[23]. 
In modern societies and nations, X- and Y-matrices interact, with one of 
them permanently predominating. Nevertheless, the matrices are not exclusive 
entirely of each other. Both X and Y-matrices co-exist simultaneously in any given 
case. In other words, the society social structure can be described as a dynamic 
binary-conjugate structure of these two interrelating, yet alternative institutional 
complexes. The supremacy of one matrix over the other is usually constant in the 
course of history. The dominant institutions of the prevailing matrices therefore 
play a role of a performance framework for complementary institutions from the 
other matrix as it is presented on the figure 3 [23]. 
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Economics
Supreme conditional ownership Private ownership
Redistribution (accumulation-coordination-distribution) Exchange (buying-selling)
Cooperation Competition
Employment (unlimited term) labour Hired (short and medium term) labour
Cost limitation (X-efficiency) Profit maximization (Y-efficiency)
Politics
Administrative system (unitary) Federative structure (federation)
Vertical hierarchical authority with Centre on the top Self-government and subsidiary
General assembly with the rule of unanimity Multi-party system with the rule of democratic majority
Appointment Election
Appeals to higher levels of hierarchical authority Election
Ideology
Collectivism Individualism
Egalitarianism Stratification
Order Freedom
Well-being-oriented Pecuniary-oriented
Generalization-Integralism/Holism Specialisation-Atomization/Mereism
X-matrix Y-matrix
 
Figure 4. Institutions of X- and Y-matrix and their functions
Source: [23]
The X-matrix institutions are predominant in China, Russia, and India along 
with most Latin American and Asian countries. In these cases Y-matrix institutions 
are “a must” but they have additional and complementary functions. Conversely, 
Y-matrix institutions prevail in most European countries and in North America, 
whereas X-matrix institutions are supportive. On the Figure 4 the structures and 
functions of basic institutions in X- and Y-matrices through each of three spheres 
are presented [23].
3. Institutional analysis of real estate bubble –  
empirical research
In the research about real estate bubble the institutional basis could not be 
ignored. It is crucial to take into consideration institutional factors, due to the 
fact that in the early stages of formation of economic bubble, prices are raising 
The institutional matrices theory as the basis of explanation of real estate bubble
121
as a result of logical and economically justified reasons. For example, the cause of 
increase in the prices of houses can be a growing population. When the number 
of people reporting the demand for houses is increasing and the supply is rela-
tively stable or growing at a slower rate, increase in prices appears to be economi-
cally justified. Prices may also rise due to increased income and in the situation of 
limited supply. In this situation the price is again the result of demand and supply. 
Therefore, irrespective of how expensive the houses are, as long as economic jus-
tification for higher prices could be found in reference to the fundamentals, the 
price increase is not a bubble. However this mechanism is often disturbed when 
there is a crisis of institutions in the area of factors influencing the price increase. 
In order to explain the real estate bubble process it is important to iden-
tify the prevailing combination of institutional matrices on the ground of the 
presented institutional matrices theory. It is obvious that without institutions of 
a market economy in the economic sphere, the institutions of federalism in the 
political area and ideology of individualism, there would not be the real estate 
bubble. Clearly, as it has been already mentioned, it has never been the pure X- or 
Y-matrix. Therefore, the environment for real estate bubble is the combination 
of two matrices with the domination of Y-matrix with its set of basic institutions. 
The basic institutions of Y-matrix are some kind of underlying (necessary) condi-
tions in creation of the growth beyond the fundamentals. However they could 
not be seen as the only cause of their formation. Referring to the previously de-
scribed definition of economic bubble it should be noted that basic institutions 
of Y-matrix allow the creation of sustainable growth of prices which could be dis-
torted and turned into speculation with the end in disastrous bubble economy. 
The examples of such kind of distortion are presented in the research part of 
article in two groups: unintended effects of intervention in the market mecha-
nism and wrongly understood full “liberalization” of market and deregulation of 
all market processes.
3.1. Unintended effects of intervention in the market mechanism 
One of the key factors contributing to the formation of real estate bubble is 
intervention in the market mechanism affecting the balanced proportion of basic in-
stitutions of a dominant and complementary matrix in the economic system. There 
are many examples of intervention in terms of real estate market. The most signifi-
cant in terms of repercussion in the economy have been examined in this article. 
The first and foremost example of intervention was the establishment in the 
United States of America two sources of housing finance: The Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and The Federal Home Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac). The organizations were chartered by Congress of the United States 
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to create a secondary market for residential mortgage loans. President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt created Fannie Mae in 1938 as part of New Deal program. The 
main purpose was to help jump start the national housing market after the Great 
Depression. Freddie Mac could be characterized by the much shorter history, due to 
the fact that it was founded in 1970 [15]. Mission of both organizations was to help 
working families access to long-term mortgage or providing to them quality rental 
housing. The objective of organizations was to create a system for stabilization the 
home mortgage market, increasing the possibility of buying and rental for the less 
wealthy Americans [13]. In addition, they were involved in supporting families who 
have problems with self-payment of the mortgages. Thus secure many people from 
losing their homes. At the time when the loan was not repaid they took the obliga-
tion to sell the property on their own at the price close to market value [35].
Assets hold by them – through mortgage securitizations and direct portfolio 
holdings – have increased from approximately 7% of total residential mortgage 
market originations in 1980 (about 78 billion dollars) to about 47% in the year 
2003 (3.6 trillion dollars). By the year 2010, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac owned 
or guaranteed about half of all outstanding mortgages in the United States, in-
cluding a considerable share of sub-prime mortgages. They financed 63% of 
new mortgages originated that year. Other federal agencies, such as the Federal 
Housing Administration and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, insured an-
other 23% of home loans. Therefore it means that federal taxpayers guaranteed 
approximately 86% of all new mortgage originations in 2010 [32]. 
The involvement of the organizations equity-related with the government 
of the United States was an important factor of creation the housing bubble. 
Guarantee of mortgages for the insolvent individuals without creditworthiness 
was some kind of J. Kornai’s softening budget constraint. The overall objective of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has not been achieved. 
The evidence of this is an analysis performed on the basis of data about sales 
prices of new homes sold in the United States [1]. As presented on the figure 4 
between the years 1969 and 1970 it was observed the decline of the median sales 
prices of new homes from 25 600 to 23 400 dollars in the year of establishment 
of Freddie Mac. In the period of first ten years of activity of this organization there 
was a significant increase of sales prices median for about 176% in comparison 
to the year 1970. For better understanding of this trend the growth of prices be-
tween 1963 and 1970 amounted to only 30%. It must be underlined that the first 
few years after the establishment of the organization, annual increases ranged 
from a few to several per cent reaching the peak between 1972 and 1973 at the 
level of 18%. In light of these trends the overall aim of Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae has not been achieved and the huge increases since 1970 were the unin-
tended effects of intervention in the market mechanism. 
The institutional matrices theory as the basis of explanation of real estate bubble
123
Moreover, during the first five years of the twenty-first century, growth in 
median sales price of new houses has reached enormous proportions. During 
this period the median increased for about 43% from 169 000 dollars in 2000 to 
240 900 dollars in 2005. This trend, however, has not been maintained for a long 
time and in the next two years there were seen growths for only 1–2%. These in-
creases preceded the collapse of the property market in 2008 and 2009 with the 
decreases reaching the levels of 6 and 7%.
 
Figure 5. Median sales prices of new homes sold in the United States  
between 1963 and 2010
Source: own elaboration based on [1]
The culmination point of a very long-lasting period of boom in the property 
market was the increase of involvement of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into 
the support of insolvent borrowers. In the first period of the 90s the maximum 
amount of debt, which was granted to the American family with an average in-
come amounted to about 90 thousand dollars. Ten years later the amount of 
granted debt increased to 200 thousand dollars. Taking into account a growth of 
house prices in the decade of 90s of approximately 31% the increase in granted 
debt had no economic explanation [35].
In connection to the subject of this paper organizations established in order 
to stabilize market mechanism in the area of mortgage loans could be seen as the 
framed within basic institutions characteristic for the X-matrix. Due to the lack 
of strict rules based rather on economic factors such as creditworthiness they 
become a tool of speculation and led to the blow of enormous real estate bub-
ble. The idea of founding this kind of stabilization organizations in the intention 
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was not bad. However, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guarantees and secure the 
mortgage without taking into consideration the strict, healthy criteria. Taking 
over more and more debt and engagement in the huge credit actions, without 
expectation of discipline in debt service and a hope of repayment of debt was 
a departure from the basic institutions of Y-matrices. Ideological basis of activities 
of these organizations involving the support for less wealthy part of community 
was closer to the principles of collectivism and well-being-orientation rather than 
individualistic thinking directed for the maximisation of profits. In effect, subsi-
dizing such activities under the motto of stabilization of real estate market had 
to failure because it has become a field for fraud and moral hazard in situation 
where everyone could borrow money in the hope that the debt will be taken over 
by the government supporting organizations.
The examination of Polish and Spanish mortgage market does not provide 
the evidence of intervention in the market mechanism in the scale similar to 
the United States. However the performed examination of these markets shows 
important institutions characteristic for the X-matrix as a part of social hous-
ing policy of these countries. The first observed in Poland is connected with 
the National Strategy for Social Policy for the years 2007–2013 (as a part of the 
National Development Plan). The aim of this policy was prevention against social 
exclusion in the context of access to housing. It was done through improvement 
of the financial framework of affordable rental housing program and develop-
ment of affordable rental dwelling co-financed by preferential loan granted from 
National Housing Fund resources (located in National Economy Bank – BGK). 
The preferential loans were granted for Social Building Association (TBS) and 
housing cooperatives for building and adaptation for rental. The flats financed 
with the participation of National Housing Fund were rented to families who 
do not own the legal title to another flat, as well as those who have a moder-
ate income per head in the family.[10] Spanish Ministry of Housing has created 
a National Plan for housing and renovation with the perspective of 2009–2012. 
The purpose of the plan was the elimination of barriers of access to houses by 
Spanish households connected mainly with the difference between the market 
price of house and economic capacity of households. It was done on the ground 
of social aim stated by the Spanish Constitution: creation of necessary conditions 
for a decent and suitable home to live for everyone, which is the right especially 
for those citizens with economic difficulties and lower-income groups [11]. This 
aim is strictly connected with the mentioned collectivism as an X-matrix basic 
institution in ideology sphere.
Another form of intervention in the market mechanism in Poland was the 
system of subsidies which was available till the end of the year 2012. The 50% 
of mortgage interest payments (calculated on a reference rate basis) could be 
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subsidies for a period of 8 years according to the “Act for the Finance Assistance 
of Families in the Purchase of Their Own Flat”. The scope of the subsidies was 
restricted to the flats and single-family dwellings with the certain disposable area. 
In addition, the mortgage loans under this program must be denominated in 
polish zloty and there were also restrictions in connection with the price of the 
dwelling [10]. This kind of subsidies in connection with the real estate market 
significantly influenced the decision about purchase of new flats and was an ad-
ditional factor of enormous price increase.
Another form of intervention in the real estate market mechanism which was 
observed in was a tax deductions and subsidies system. Amendments to the Law 
on Personal Income Tax, which entered into force on January 2007 in Poland led 
to the liquidation of interest relief, and thus limited the intervention in this area. 
However, all tax payers who took out mortgages to the end of 2006 may still 
benefit from the deduction of interest on these loans. Tax deduction mechanism 
is the ability to deduct from the tax base actually incurred paid interests on debt 
granted for the housing needs. The relief was intended as kind of intervention 
in the housing market as a possible deduction increased, in fact, real borrower’s 
ability to pay the mortgage debt. It was an incentive for the decision about buy-
ing new house.
In the Spain in the period of real estate bubble the mechanism of mort-
gage tax relief made mortgage repayments tax deductible. Mortgage tax relief 
was available for loans on primary residences. The tax deduction amounted to 
15% of the mortgage payments up to an annual limit of 9.015 euros, giving the 
maximum amount of annual savings of 1.352 euros [21]. 
The mechanism of tax credit was used in a much larger scale in the United 
States. It has found its source in the approved by President Herbert Hoover 
Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 with the aim of providing liquidity to mort-
gage lenders. Designed relief has been a repeatable subjected to criticism, but as 
a part of incentive and stimulation system in the real estate market has not been 
reformed for a very long time. The main reason was that it was an essential part 
of real estate market development and incentive to achieve “American Dream”. 
Interest deduction was a very expensive way to support the property market 
because it costs annually more than 20 billion dollars in the period between the 
year 2000 and 2007 [16]. 
In connection to the research carried out in the article [8] available 
at HousingEconomics.com about beneficiaries of tax deductions in the property 
market in America it must be emphasized that the main recipients of these incen-
tives were in 2008 the middle class taxpayers with the income in the range of 50 
000 to 200 000 dollars. This could be the confirmation of emerging criticism on 
this kind of intervention. The tool that was intended to promote the purchase 
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of real estate assets by less wealthy part of society, in fact, has become support-
ing tool of speculation. It was the primary contributing factor in the creation of 
American housing bubble. It has awarded the highest subsidies, in the form of 
tax deductions of up to a million dollars to the richest one third of Americans 
willing to buy the biggest and most expensive houses, while rejecting subsidies 
to the two thirds of American income earners who cannot buy a house at all or 
who cannot take advantage of the housing deduction due to the fact that it does 
not exceed their standard deduction granted to all taxpayers [16].
The average size of houses bought by Americans has grown from 949 square 
feet in 1900 to 2436 in 2005 [16]. With reference to the theory of institutional 
matrices an intervention through tax deductions reflect activities characteristic 
for the basic institutions of X-matrix. There were intended to be a help in achiev-
ing the general welfare and availability of house for everyone even less wealthy 
citizens of the United States. However, the inappropriate design of the deduc-
tion works for the one third of wealthiest Americans and again support rather 
speculative activities conducted by them. As the support of these it is worth to 
see into the Table 1 which shows the comparison of home ownership between 
various developed countries which introduced or not the tax deduction system. 
The analysis of the data shows that such developed countries like the United 
Kingdom or France have reached high home ownership rate in 2001 equal or 
even higher than the United States, without the expensive system of tax deduc-
tion. The aim of higher home ownership rate could be achieved also by other, 
less expensive ways. 
Table 1 
Comparison of home ownership between developed countries
Country
Tax deduction for 
housing
Home ownership 
rate in 2001
[%]
United States Yes 69,0
United Kingdom No 71,1
Germany No 43,6
France No 63,1
Source: [4]
The tax deductions system and subsidies in the real estate sector as the tool 
of stimulation is the soft budget constraint in the J. Kornai meaning which influ-
ences the balanced combination of institutional matrices.
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3.2. Wrongly understood full “liberalization”  
of market and deregulation 
In the last part of this paper the real estate bubbles are explained taking into 
consideration wrongly understood full “liberalization” and deregulation of all 
market processes. As an element of this process, especially connected with credit 
system, soft budget constraint is described on the basis of available evidence 
in the examined countries. There are identified and described most visible and 
important aspects of soft budget constraint. In connection to the institutional 
matrices theory there are presented cases in which there were attempts to elimi-
nate, from the combination of matrices, the complementary matrix. It was per-
formed in order to create a system of domination of Y-matrix. It is in opposite to 
the discussed intervention in the market mechanism when the prevailing matrix 
attempted to be dominate was the X-matrix. Aspiration for absolute deregula-
tion was the source of many deformations in healthy functioning market system 
such as lowering lending standards, an increase in lending on a large scale in 
many countries, securitization process and other things leading to the creation 
of moral hazard. 
Following behind Grzegorz Kolodko the reasons of such negative events as 
financial crisis and economic bubble could be found in the isolation of the finan-
cial sphere from the real economy [26]. The financial sphere was out of control, 
as a consequence of liberalisation of financial markets. On the way to the ideolog-
ical freedom and in the process of embedding of freedom in the market economy, 
at both the creation of debt for the customers, but also at the stage of financing 
banks themselves, was a high deformation of market system, and unbalanced 
structure of the combination of basic institutions. As the result of this process 
there has been a very dynamic development of financial instruments, including 
the securitization process.
Securitization is the process which allows banks to turn traditionally illiquid 
financial assets (bank loans) into the marketable securities. The most popular 
method of conversion of loan into tradable security was mortgage backed securi-
ties (MBS) and collaterized debt obligation (CDO). Securitization allows funding 
lenders to transfer the risk connected with loan and increase their liquidity by 
selling it in the secondary market as a parcel of loans [16]. The consequences 
of securitization were several. First, the symbiotic relationship between lender 
and borrower has been broken. Banks historically keep the mortgages on the 
books and service the loan directly (keeping a relationship with the borrower). 
Securitization allows to separate mortgage origination from mortgage servicing. 
Therefore originators of loans had no longer a vested interest in the viability of 
a borrower in a long-term. It led to definitely lower lending standards. Moreover, 
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it allowed banks to issue more loans than their balance sheet might otherwise. 
Secondly, securitization made very difficult dealing with problem loans. It was 
due to the fact that mortgages were in pools with cash flows allocated according 
to a prearranged dynamic. As a result no one party were in charge of a particular 
mortgage. Previously borrower was able to negotiate directly with the bank hold-
ing mortgage, securitization made potential loan modifications through negotia-
tion almost impossible [33]. 
Table 2 
Securitized subprime loans
Year Total mortgages 
that were sub-
prime
[%]
Subprime mort-
gage that were 
securitized
[%]
2001 7,8 54,1
2002 7,4 62,9
2003 8,4 61,1
2004 13,5 75,7
2005 21,3 76,3
2006 20,1 74,8
Source: [16]
The significance of the securitization process in the creation of the real es-
tate bubble was visible in the United States and Spain. The increasing level of 
securitization in the United States is shown in the Table 2. In 2006 20% of mort-
gages were subprime and 75% of them were securitized. In 2006 value of the 
subprime mortgages amounted to about billion dollars which was about 8% of 
Gross Domestic Product on the peak of economic growth of the United States 
[36]. Spanish Mortgage-Backed Securities (SMBS) regulated in 1992 were very 
popular and after the ten years Spain was the third issuer of MBS in Europe [2]. 
In 2010 value of all securities (mortgage-backed and assets-backed) was so high 
that the Spain reached the second place in Europe as an issuer [3].
The development of the securitization process in Poland has been strictly 
connected with the progress of law regulations in this matter which was sig-
nificantly delayed in comparison the changes in the Polish financial market. The 
Polish banking sector has not been interested in the process of securitization 
for a very long time mainly due to the lack of formal definition of the process, 
regulations in the banking law or limitation in transactions conducted by the 
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securitization fund [39]. According to the report from 2013 the market of secu-
ritization does not practically exist in Poland. In the last several years there have 
been realized by banks only two important transactions which have not been 
connected with the mortgage loans [19].
The main problem with the new financial instruments and securitization 
process especially visible in the United States was involvement of banks which 
activity were deregulated mainly in the area of connecting the lending (commer-
cial) and investing banking (abrogation of the Glass-Steagall Act). What more, in 
the process were also engaged the organizations which have never been regulat-
ed. The system called by Paul Krugman as the system of “shadow banking” exag-
gerated the conventional banking system [31]. Lack of regulations in this part of 
economy led to an unbalanced combination dominated by Y-matrix institutions 
with the aim of maximisation of profits, especially by lenders and Wall Street 
financial institutions such as hedge funds and money funds. It was a mechanism 
of transferring risk connected with bad debt and softening budget constraint by 
banks and similar institutions. This process accelerated the financing of the real 
estate bubble and also supports the speculative activity.
The next evidence of softening budget constraint from the perspective of 
commercial banks was connected with the capital requirements. Loosening 
standards and aggressive lending led in the United States to decreasing capital 
requirements. In 1990 the capital requirements amounted to 10% whereas in 
the year 2005 it was only 2,5% (minimum capital requirement for Freddie Mac 
and Fannie Mae). Comparing capital requirements of the United States with the 
United Kingdom and BASEL we can see that the difference was considerable. 
They set the requirements at the level of 8% [16]. As a result another accelerat-
ing mechanism has been launched under the deregulation trend. The decline in 
capital requirements exposes banks on the high level of unjustifiable risk.  
Further signs of softening budget constraint in the United States could be 
found in the commercial banks operations growth. Through acquisition at the 
end of 2002, there were 7887 government-insured commercial banks in com-
parison to 12 347 in 1990. The level of acquisition sprees in the commercial and 
investment banking sector in the late 90s led to creation of lending behemoths 
seriously dependent on economies of scale. During the last real estate boom 
in the United States the mortgage industry was heavily relied on human capital 
and expensive technology. The loan origination process was based on the high-
technology platforms connected with millions of dollars investments. Due to the 
high level of fixed costs, the profit of originators depended more on volume than 
quality [16].
From the borrowers’ perspective soft budget constraint (soft credit) is vis-
ible when lenders began relaxing lending standards and loan approval guideline. 
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One of the primary lending standards is the level of loan-to-value ratio (LTV). 
Higher level of ratio means higher risk exposure of a bank. Each bank has its own 
limits of this ratio and in the situation of exceeding this ratio higher down pay-
ment is required. Safe level of this ratio is when it is below 80%. During the boom 
on the real estate market in Spain the LTV amounted to about 64% [12], however 
there are still available sources of offers of banks from 2010 with the ratio 100% 
[18]. The average value of LTV in the United States increased from 88% in the 
middle of 90s to 94% in 2005 [9]. In Poland in the period of boom most of credits 
were granted with the ratio between 75 to 100%. In 2010 there were situations 
when the credit was granted for the 120% of the value of property. In the Alior 
Bank S.A. proposal there were credits with LTV at this level [20]. However, the 
Polish Financial Supervisory Authority implemented several recommendations 
regarding mortgages such as the calculation of creditworthiness, the limitation of 
credits in foreign currencies etc. [27]. These recommendations had a significant 
influence on the creation of mortgages. They protected Poland against the blow 
of speculative real estate bubble. 
The second important credit standard is the maturity of the credit. The re-
search performed in each of the examined countries shows that in the period of 
boom on the real estate market the maturity period was extended and there were 
credits with the maturity period above 30 years (with the maximum maturity of 50 
years). Margins and other charges connected with mortgage loans (low down pay-
ment etc.) were in the period of enormous real estate price increase on the risky 
low level. The main reason of that fact was a wish of further acceleration of credit 
action by banks and desire of joining to the group of beneficiaries of rising market.
The signs of relaxing approval guidance are visible in the United States in 
the form of the stated-income loan. This loan was traditionally extended to bor-
rowers who could not confirm their income due to the fact that they were self-
employed or did not want to generate income tax returns for personal reason. 
It was used by lenders as a standard also for the borrowers with easily verified 
income (including fixed income) [16].
Other products with the feature of soft budget constraint and avoidance of 
regulations were stated asset loans, no-ratio loans and no-documentation loans. 
Generally a prime loan has the requirement of verification of assets to cover 2, 5 
or 12 months’ worth of mortgage payments which should be available to the bor-
rower. In the state asset loan, the borrower was obliged only to state the amount 
of assets, not verifying them. In a non-ratio loan, the income of the borrower was 
not disclosed; the underwriter decided whether the person’s business, position 
and tenure suggest they can repay the loan. No-documentation loans were prob-
ably the softest products. The borrower did not even state his occupation and the 
underwriting decision was based entirely on his credit history and collateral [16].
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All above factors led to the unbalanced structure with the dominant Y-matrix 
with the wrongly understood freedom in terms of banking practices and stan-
dards. This unbalanced institutional combination was the field for the moral haz-
ard and accelerator in blowing the enormous increase in properties prices.
4. Conclusion
The creation of a balanced institutional structure with the optimal combina-
tion of the dominant and complementary institutions positively influencing eco-
nomic growth and preventing against deformations such as an economic bubble 
is very challenging and hard work. The combination completely dominated by 
one of the matrix leads to crisis and stagnation. When the market does not work 
effectively it is supplemented by the institutions on the ground of monetary and 
fiscal policy. On the other hand, the efficient market means the private owner-
ship, exchange, competition, freedom and ideological individualism.
Results of the research discussed in this paper show that real estate bubble 
was created in the environment of combination of two matrices with the domina-
tion of Y-matrix. Basic institutions of that matrix were necessary conditions for 
development and growth in the real estate market. The study shows that in the 
examined cases the development and market growth was repeatedly distorted 
and turned into situation when the perceived and psychological value of houses 
exceeds their economic value. The identified institutions which influenced bal-
anced structure and supported the blow of the bubble were divided into two 
main groups. 
First group, unintended effects of intervention in the market economy mech-
anism, was against the dominant matrix and was planned as the response for the 
needs of less wealthy part of society or the way of stabilization and/or stimulation 
of real estate market. The overall objectives of interventions in the examined 
cases have not been achieved. The best evidence of that fact was an enormous 
increase in houses prices in the first years after establishment of Freddie Mac. 
The efficiency of tax deductions and subsidies as the way of stimulation of real 
estate market was also questioned due to the fact that higher ownership rate was 
achieved in several countries without such expensive system reliefs. Besides, this 
mechanism was used mainly by wealthiest part of society which was in conflict 
with the basic assumptions of the program. In all the presented cases of interven-
tion in the market mechanism, established with good intentions, the result of the 
intervention was the creation of mechanism finally supporting the speculation 
and blowing the bubble. The main reason of that fact was connected with the 
inappropriate design of the institutions of complementary matrix. In the case of 
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organisations Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac the problem was that they guaranteed 
and secured the mortgage without taking into consideration the strict, healthy 
criteria. As a result their activities become a field of fraud and moral hazard, creat-
ing situation where everyone could borrow money in the hope that the debt will 
be taken over by someone else. The conclusion for this group of institution based 
on the research is that it is crucial in the case of dominance of Y-matrix to create 
the safe system of complementary institutions which are protected against such 
speculation and moral hazard.
The second group wrongly understood full “liberalization” and deregula-
tion of all market processes through softening the budget constraint, was in 
line with the dominant matrix institutions and was planned as a tool for stimu-
lation of the real estate market. This group was called as wrongly understood 
full “liberalization” with reason. It shows that liberalization in each of examined 
cases was a desire to eliminate of the complementary matrix from balanced 
institutional structure. “Wrongly” means that liberalization is possible in the 
healthy economy however it does not mean that market mechanism could work 
without any institutions. Therefore, deregulation in each of examined cases 
led to isolation of financial sphere from the real economy. It was done at the 
level of lenders (banks) through softening budget constraint in the process 
of securitization or decrease of capital requirements and also at the level of 
borrowers through softening budget constraint by lowering lending standards 
such as loan-to-value ratio, maturity period or fees and charges connected with 
credit or relaxing the loans’ approval guidance by banks in the no-ratio and no-
documentation loans. 
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